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Case Notes & Comments
Can a Jury Believe My Eyes, and Should
Courts Let Experts Tell Them Why Not:
The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on
Cross-Racial Eyewitness Identification in
New York After People v. Young
Jody E. Frampton*
The identification of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy.
The hazards of such testimony are established by a formidable
number of instances in the records of English
and American trials. **
Introduction
Eyewitness identification is one of the most powerful tools
that a prosecutor has at his disposal. There is little more dra-
matic or damning than a confident eyewitness who is able to
point at the defendant and identify him as the perpetrator; it is
hardly surprising, therefore, that jurors are inclined to believe
the identifications made by these key witnesses.
However, there are many problems inherent in the process
by which an eyewitness perceives, stores, and recalls their
memories of the defendant which can ultimately lead to an in-
correct identification. A complete understanding of the factors
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Pace University School of Law; M.S. Forensic Science,
2003, Virginia Commonwealth University; B.S. Biology, 2001, Union College. I
would like to thank my parents, Betty Ann and Jim Frampton, for their love and
support, as well as all the people who read and commented on earlier drafts of this
article.
** FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VENZETTI: A CRITICAL ANALY-
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which can sometimes lead to misidentification is often beyond
the knowledge and experience of the average juror.' As Justice
Marshall pointed out in his oft-quoted dissent from Manson v.
Brathwaite, there is an "unusual threat to the truth-seeking
process posed by the frequent untrustworthiness of eyewitness
identification testimony."2 This is especially true with regard to
cross-racial identifications. 3
One possible solution to this problem is to admit expert tes-
timony which would educate the jury on the ways in which eye-
witness accounts can be flawed. Courts which evaluate the
admissibility of scientific expert testimony under both the Frye4
"general acceptance" standard and the Daubert5/Federal Rules
of Evidence (FRE) 702 standard have often been reluctant to
allow expert testimony on eyewitness identification. These
courts cite a variety of reasons for this, most often either that
the testimony is within the ordinary knowledge and under-
standing of the average juror or that the scientific evidence is
not reliable enough. 6
1. See, e.g., Heather Sonnenberg, The Admissibility of Expert Identification
Testimony in New York Courts According to People v. Lee, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 231 (2002); Joy L. Lindo, New Jersey Jurors Are No Longer Color-
Blind Regarding Eyewitness Identification, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 1224 (2000);
Peter J. Cohen, How Shall They Be Known? Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals and Eyewitness Identification, 16 PACE L. REV. 237, 242-43 (1996); ELIZABETH
LoF-rus & JAMES DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 86-88 (3d ed.
1997).
2. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 119-20 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Marshall goes on to state that "[tihis [the untrustworthiness of eye-
witness identification testimony], combined with the fact that juries unfortunately
are often unduly receptive to such evidence, is [a] fundamental fact of judicial ex-
perience." Id. at 120.
3. Sonnenberg, supra note 1, at 241.
4. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
5. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
6. See, e.g., People v. Valentine, 385 N.Y.S.2d 545 (App. Div. 1976) (allowing
expert testimony on eyewitness identification would "trespass on the jury's do-
main"); People v. Brown, 479 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (the science underlying
the theory did not meet the Frye "general acceptance" standard); People v.
Legrand, 747 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 2002) (did not meet the Frye standard); Peo-
ple v. Smith, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 255 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 26, 2004)) (did not meet
Frye standard); People v. Carrieri, 777 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (expert testi-
mony was within the knowledge and understanding of the average juror and the
science underlying the theory did not meet the Frye standard); United States v.
Kime, 99 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 1996) (it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial
court to exclude testimony where there was not enough evidence to determine sci-
entific validity under Daubert); United States v. Hicks, 103 F.3d 837 (9th Cir.
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol27/iss3/3
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This Note argues in part that the lack of uniform standards
for New York courts to follow when deciding the admissibility of
expert testimony on cross-racial eyewitness identification evi-
dence under the Frye standard has led to inconsistency in prece-
dent and confusion for defendants, a condition which will likely
continue notwithstanding the recent Court of Appeals decision
in People v. Young. 7 Part I will identify the problems inherent
in both ordinary eyewitness identification and cross-racial iden-
tifications. Part II discusses the difference between the Frye
"general acceptability" and Daubert/FRE 702 standards, and
looks at the question of whether the admissibility of expert tes-
timony on eyewitness identification depends on the standard
that is used. Parts III-VI will summarize the history of expert
testimony on eyewitness and cross-racial identifications in New
York State under the Frye standard, including the law as it cur-
rently exists through the recent Court of Appeals cases People v.
Drake8 and People v. Young.9 Part VII looks at People v. Wil-
liams,10 a recent trial court decision which applied the Court of
Appeals' test from Young. Finally, Part VIII will decide if
Young provides clear guidelines for admissibility in the lower
courts, thus eliminating the problems of inconsistency and
confusion.
I. What are the Problems Inherent in
Eyewitness Identification?
A. The Problem of Eyewitness Testimony, Generally
Once before the jury, eyewitness testimony is very difficult
for a criminal defendant to rebut. Cross-examination of a wit-
1996) (trial court had discretion to exclude testimony if it felt it would not help the
jury).
7. 850 N.E.2d 623 (N.Y. 2006). The March 2007 Court of Appeals decision in
People v. Legrand, while articulating a test for when exclusion of expert testimony
on eyewitness identification by a trial court is an abuse of discretion, applies this
test only "where the case turns on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications and
there is little or no corroborating evidence connecting the defendant to the crime."
No. 39, 2007 N.Y. LEXIS 325 at *2 (N.Y. Mar. 27, 2007). As will be suggested
infra, this does not solve the problem remaining after People v. Young of what
standard will be used to determine what constitutes an abuse of discretion outside
this narrow situation.
8. 850 N.E.2d 630 (N.Y. 2006).
9. 850 N.E.2d 623 (N.Y. 2006).
10. No. 8989/05, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4329, (Sup. Ct. Nov. 29, 2006).
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ness and jury instructions are very often not enough to over-
come the power that a strong and confident eyewitness
identification can have." The testimony of an expert witness is
often necessary to educate the jury on the types of factors that
can affect eyewitness memory and perception. 12
Eyewitness testimony is the product of "input, retention,
and retrieval processes."1 3 The first stage, input, occurs as the
witness observes the event. The accuracy of the witness' per-
ception can be affected by any number of factors unique to that
individual or the circumstances surrounding it-the emotions
(like fear or stress) felt by the witness while observing, or exter-
nal factors like the length of the event, the distance the witness
is from the event, or lighting. 4 It is therefore possible that the
witness has inaccurately input the information into their mem-
ory even before he or she has been asked to recall it.' 5
Information can also be retained incorrectly. An eyewit-
ness stores the information he or she input from the initial ob-
servation in their memory until it needs to be recalled. 16 The
accuracy of this information may be affected by time, and by
"post-event information.' 7 It is also possible that "suggestive
questioning" (by a police officer or prosecutor in advance of tes-
timony) may have the same effect.' 8
The final stage in the process, retrieval, requires the wit-
ness to remember or recall the information that he or she has
retained during the event. 19 The ability of a witness to do so
can be affected by a number of factors, like the clever question-
ing of a prosecutor (who leads the witness to the conclusion the
prosecutor wants them to reach) or the confidence level of the
witness while testifying.20
11. Sonnenberg, supra note 1, at 231.
12. Id.
13. Lindo, supra note 1, at 1224.
14. Cohen, supra note 1, at 242-43.
15. Sonnenberg, supra note 1, at 239.
16. Cohen, supra note 1, at 242-43.
17. Id. at 243. Post-event information can include reading newspaper ac-
counts of the crime or hearing that other evidence (such as another witness identi-
fication of the defendant or a defendant's confession) exists to corroborate their
identification. Id. at 246-47.
18. Sonnenberg, supra note 1, at 239.
19. Cohen, supra note 1, at 246-47.
20. Id. at 247-48.
436 [Vol. 27:433
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There are a number of "sensory defects" that can cause in-
accuracies at any stage of this process. 21 Another factor affect-
ing perception is "weapon focus," where the witness' primary
focus during the event is on the gun, knife, or other deadly
weapon used by the perpetrator rather than on the perpetrator
himself.22 Finally, as will be discussed infra, cross-racial identi-
fication (the identification of an individual of one race by an eye-
witness of another race) can decrease the accuracy of
perception. 23
While some jurors may be aware of a few of these defects,
others can be misunderstood and/or counterintuitive. 24 As men-
tioned above, an eyewitness can become focused on a weapon
during a violent event. However, many jurors are unaware that
a violent event can affect not only a witness' initial perceptions
but can also cause a "retrograde amnesia" that can alter or
erase these initial perceptions once retained.25
Another complicated situation that jurors often do not fully
understand is that of transference. Transference describes the
idea that the expectations of a witness often color what he or
she perceives; if a witness expects to see something (whether
because of a personal/cultural bias or previous experience), it is
likely that is what the witness will remember seeing.26 Uncon-
scious transference may also occur; this is where outside factors
like newspaper/television news reports or conversation with
other individuals about the event can alter a witness' retention
of his or her initial perception without the witness even being
aware of it.27
These factors can affect any or all of the three stages in the
memory process. As they are often beyond the understanding of
the average juror (and may actually be counterintuitive), expert
21. Sonnenberg, supra note 1, at 240. These can include "speed and move-
ment, stimulus overload, the fact that the perpetrator is a stranger to the witness,
diversion of attention, excessive arousal, surprise, and limitations on the opportu-
nity to observe the face." Lindo, supra note 1, at 1226 (internal citation omitted).
22. Sonnenberg, supra note 1, at 240.
23. Lindo, supra note 1, at 1226; Sonnenberg, supra note 1, at 240.
24. Sonnenberg, supra note 1, at 240.
25. Id.
26. David M. Shofi, Comment, The New York Courts' Lack of Direction and
Discretion Regarding the Admission of Expert Identification Testimony, 13 PACE L.
REV. 1101, 1107 (1994).
27. Sonnenberg, supra note 1, at 241.
2007] 437
5
PACE LAW REVIEW
testimony is one solution to the problem of inaccurate eyewit-
ness testimony.
B. The Specific Problem of Cross-Racial Identification
Cross-racial eyewitness identification is another area in
which concerns "operate contrary to most jurors' common
sense. '28 The cross-racial phenomenon has been studied by
many investigators over the years, both in a laboratory and a
real-world setting, with the conclusion that witnesses identify
suspects of their own race more accurately than those of an-
other race. 29 This "own race bias" (ORB) may result because in-
dividuals of different races process faces differently, 30 or it may
be because witnesses are "more willing to guess at the identity
of a criminal in a cross-race identification than they are when a
same-race identification takes place."31
Regardless of the cause, most researchers in the field agree
that the ORB phenomenon is reliable and consistent across cul-
28. Id. According to the author, many commentators suggest that without ex-
pert testimony, jurors will believe that an eyewitness who is not racially
prejudiced toward defendant will be less likely to experience (or even be immune
to) cross-racial misidentification. See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Iden-
tification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 934 (1984); ELIZABETH F.
LoFTus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979).
29. LoFrus & DOYLE, supra note 1, at 86-88. Loftus and Doyle describe sev-
eral key studies, including one conducted by Malpass and Kravits where white and
black subjects looked at photographs of white and black individuals. That study
concluded that subjects correctly identified those members of their own race more
frequently than members of other races (interestingly, white subjects who at-
tended the predominantly black Howard University made false identifications of
black subjects two to three times more frequently than with white subjects, indi-
cating that proximity and exposure to another race does not erase the own-race
bias or potential for misidentification). Loftus also cites a study by Brigham et al
where clerks in a Florida convenience store were asked to identify photographs of
black and white customers who had been in the store two hours earlier. The clerks
were predominantly white. 76% of the clerks tried to identify a white customer
and 82% to identify a black customer; 55% misidentified the black customer while
35% misidentified the white customer. The overall pattern, that witnesses identify
suspects of their own race more accurately than that of other races, is "clear." Id.
at 87. See also Roy S. Malpass & Jerome Kravits, Recognition for Faces of Own
and Other Race, 13 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 330 (1969); John C. Brigham
et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Identification in a Field Setting, 42 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 673 (1982).
30. LoFTus & DOYLE, supra note 1, at 88.
31. Id. (citing Tooley et al., Facial Recognition: Weapon Effect and Attention
Focus, 17 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 845 (1987)).
[Vol. 27:433
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tural and racial groups.32 Recent studies have also failed to find
a link between the racial attitude or prejudice of an individual
and his or her memory for the faces of other races.33 While "a
fair degree of empirical support exists for the notion that inter-
racial contact has some degree of influence on the magnitude of
the ORB," it is still unknown exactly why this occurs. 34
At least two studies have suggested that "cross-examina-
tion has not been shown effective in allowing jurors to distin-
guish accurate from inaccurate eyewitnesses. '" 35 This is
especially true in the context of a cross-racial identification.
Another commentator suggests a potential solution: based on
the reliability of and the general agreement in the community
on the importance of ORB, expert testimony should be used in
cases where cross-racial eyewitness identification is an issue.36
32. Christian Meissner & John Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the
Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 3, 5 (2001). Some courts acknowledge this as well: the Maryland Court
of Appeals stated in a recent decision that "there is a strong consensus among
researchers conducting both laboratory and field studies on cross-racial identifica-
tion that some witnesses are more likely to misidentify members of other races
than their own." Smith v. State, 880 A.2d 288, 296 (Md. 2005).
33. Meissner & Brigham, supra note 32, at 7.
34. Id. at 8-9. The authors suggest that perceptual learning is the most popu-
lar explanation. In perceptual learning, practice and experience lead to an in-
creased ability to perceive and retain information obtained in a particular
environment. In other words, as an individual becomes more familiar with a stim-
ulus through exposure, his ability to quickly and accurately process the features of
the stimulus which do not change increase.
35. Id. at 25 (citing R. C. L. Lindsay et al., Mock-Juror Belief of Accurate and
Inaccurate Eyewitnesses: A Replication and Extension, 13 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 333
(1989); R. C. L. Lindsay et al., Can People Detect Eyewitness-Identification Accu-
racy Within and Across Situations? 66 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 79 (1981)).
36. Id. at 26-27. The authors go on to cite several studies which demonstrate
that the factors affecting the ORB and cross-racial eyewitness testimony are often
beyond the ken of the average juror. See John C. Brigham & Robert K. Bothwell,
The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifica-
tions, 7 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 19 (1983); Jennifer L. Devonport et al., Eyewitness Iden-
tification Evidence: Evaluating Commonsense Evaluations, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y
& L. 338 (1997). Another commentator has suggested that, based on the results of
recent scientific studies, defense expert testimony on cross-racial eyewitness iden-
tification alone may not actually have any effect on the decision of the jury. She
emphasizes that only by reinforcing the testimony through jury instructions and
closing arguments can such expert testimony have the desired effect. See Jennifer
L. Overbeck, Beyond Admissibility: A Practical Look at the Use of Eyewitness Ex-
pert Testimony in the Federal Courts, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1895, 1912-18 (2005).
7
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Many courts do not allow the use of expert testimony on
cross-racial identifications, 37 although the Supreme Court has
"tacitly acknowledged"38 that race is a factor in making an accu-
rate identification. 39 This subject will be discussed in more de-
tail infra, but one reason why courts tend to exclude the
testimony is because they do not believe the factors affecting
misidentification are beyond the knowledge of the lay juror.40
One commentator has suggested that jurors' beliefs about cross-
racial identification are largely incorrect and that "expert testi-
mony affects the beliefs and judgments of individual jurors, in-
creases jury deliberation time and modestly increases the
number of acquittals and hung juries."41
37. See, e.g., People v. Legrand, 747 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 2002), affd, 814
N.Y.S.2d 37 (1st Dept. App. Div. 2006), rev'd, No. 39, 2007 N.Y. LEXIS 325 (N.Y.
Mar. 27, 2007); People v. Carrieri, 777 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 2004); State v.
Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1999); Commonwealth v. Simmons, 662 A.2d 621 (Pa.
1995); United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Hicks,
103 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 1994).
These courts, while allowing expert testimony on cross-racial identification in the-
ory (with the exception of Cromedy, which held that such testimony was per se
inadmissible in New Jersey, and Simmons, which held that expert testimony on
eyewitness identification in general was inadmissible in Pennsylvania), hold that
an appellate court can only review the decision of a trial court to exclude the testi-
mony for abuse of discretion. Trial courts often exclude testimony because they do
not believe it would be helpful to the jury, because the factors affecting cross-racial
identification are not beyond the ken of the ordinary juror, or because they believe
the scientific research is not conclusive enough.
38. Jules Epstein, Tri-State Vagaries: The Varying Responses of Delaware,
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania to the Phenomenon of Mistaken Identifications, 12
WIDENER L. REV. 327, 348 (2006).
39. In Mason v. Braithwaite, the Court stated that "Glover [the police officer
who had contact with the defendant and identified him] himself was a Negro and
unlikely to perceive only 'general features of hundreds of Hartford black males."'
432 U.S. 98, 115 (1977) (internal citation omitted). The implication of this state-
ment is that had Glover been white, his identification of the black defendant would
have been more suspect.
40. See, e.g., Carrieri, 777 N.Y.S.2d 627, 628; but see Commonwealth v. Zim-
merman, 804 N.E.2d 336, 344 (Mass. 2004) (Cordy, J., concurring) (two justices on
the Massachusetts Supreme Court, in concurrence, stating that the problems with
cross-racial identification are "beyond the ordinary experience and knowledge of
the average juror").
41. Johnson, supra note 28, at 946-51. The author cites three classic studies
in this area: LoFTus, supra note 28; A. YARMY, PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS TESTI-
MONY (1979); George Rahaim & Stanley Brodsky, Empirical Evidence Versus Com-
mon Sense: Juror and Lawyer Knowledge of Eyewitness Accuracy, 7 L. & PSYCHOL.
REV. (1982). In the Loftus study, the following multiple-choice questions were
asked to 500 college students at the University of Washington:
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol27/iss3/3
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II. How Do We Evaluate the Admissibility of Expert
Testimony On Eyewitness Identification?
Testimony on eyewitness identification is a type of scien-
tific expert evidence, and will be evaluated by a court under one
of two approaches: the Frye "general acceptability" standard or
the Daubert/FRE 702 standard.42
A. The Frye Standard
Frye v. United States43 articulated a four-part test to be
used by a trial court when determining the admissibility of sci-
entific expert testimony. In Frye, the defendant was tried for
second-degree murder and wanted to introduce expert testi-
mony at trial on a new scientific technique, a systolic blood
Two women are walking to school one morning, one of them is Asian and the
other white. Suddenly, two men, one black and one white, jump into their
path and attempt to grab their purses. Later, the women are shown photo-
graphs of known purse snatchers in the area. Which statement best de-
scribes your view of the woman's ability to identify the purse snatchers?
(a) Both the Asian and the white woman will find the white man harder
to identify than the black man;
(b) The white woman will find the black man more difficult to identify
than the white man;
(c) The Asian woman will have an easier time than the white woman
making an accurate identification of both men;
(d) The white woman will find the black man easier to identify than the
white man.
LoFTus, supra note 28, at 122. The correct answer, (b), was chosen by little more
than half (58%) of the respondents. The Rahaim & Brodsky study asked an almost
identical question to forty-five lawyers and twenty-eight non-lawyers. 39% of the
non-lawyers selected the correct answer, while more than 40% of the lawyers chose
an incorrect answer. Rahaim & Brodsky, supra note 41, at 9, 13.
42. There is a third approach followed in Wisconsin. Courts in that state ap-
ply a unique "relevancy test" for the admission of expert evidence:
Simply put, expert testimony is admissible if it is relevant, the witness is
qualified based on his or her 'specialized knowledge,' and the testimony will
assist the trier of fact in better understanding the evidence or determining a
fact in issue. The reliability of the expert's reasoning, methodology, or tests
are left to the trier of fact as matters of weight.
Daniel Blinka, Expert Testimony and the Relevancy Rule in the Age of Daubert, 90
MARQ. L. REV. 173, 174 (2006).
43. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
9
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pressure deception test (an early version of the modern-day lie
detector) to demonstrate his innocence. 44
The court set forth four factors for a trial court to consider
when determining admissibility. First, the witness should be
competent in his field of expertise. 45 Second, the "expert testi-
mony [must] be based on a scientific principle or procedure
which has been 'sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."' 46 Third,
the court must inquire "whether the proffered expert testimony
is beyond the ken of the jury."47 However, "even if the proposed
testimony [is] not beyond the jury's ken, [the Court of Appeals
has] upheld the admission of expert testimony for the purpose
of clarifying an area of which the jurors have a general aware-
ness. '4 Finally, the testimony must be "relevant to the issue
and facts of the individual case."49
To a certain extent, the Frye standard defers to the scien-
tific community. As noted above, a judge does not have to deter-
mine the reliability, truth, or validity of the novel theory under
Frye; instead, he must look to the consensus of the relevant sci-
entific community. However, a judge still has discretion to ex-
clude expert testimony he feels is within the common
knowledge of the average juror. New York State adheres to the
44. Id. at 1013. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, after artic-
ulating the test for admissibility of scientific expert testimony, excluded the prof-
fered testimony and affirmed the defendant's conviction. Id. at 1014.
45. Id. Thus, "'the expert should be possessed of the requisite skill, training,
education, knowledge, or experience from which it can be assumed that the infor-
mation imparted or the opinion rendered is reliable.'" People v. Legrand, 747
N.Y.S.2d 733, 740 (Sup. Ct. 2002) (quoting Matott v. Ward, 399 N.E.2d 532, 534
(N.Y. 1979)).
46. People v. Wernick, 674 N.E.2d 322, 324 (N.Y. 1996) (quoting Frye, 293 F.
1013, 1014). Under the Frye "general acceptance" standard, a judge does not in-
quire into whether the theory is accurate or reliable; rather, he must determine
only whether there is a consensus in the appropriate scientific community as to the
theory's reliability or accuracy. Legrand, 747 N.Y.S.2d 733, 740.
47. Legrand, 747 N.Y.S.2d 733, 741. "The guiding principle is that expert
opinion is proper when it would help to clarify an issue calling for professional or
technical knowledge, possessed by the expert and beyond the ken of the typical
juror." DeLong v. County of Erie, 457 N.E.2d 717, 722 (N.Y. 1983).
48. People v. Mooney, 559 N.E.2d 1274, 1277 (N.Y. 1990) (Kaye, J.,
dissenting).
49. Legrand, 747 N.Y.S.2d 733, 741.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol27/iss3/3
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Frye standard, even though Daubert has become the rule at the
federal level. 50
B. The Daubert Standard
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals51 settled an issue
that had been debated in the legal community since the Federal
Rules of Evidence were enacted in 1976: did the Frye "general
acceptance" standard survive Rule 702's enactment? 52 The Su-
preme Court's holding in Daubert (that Frye was "incompatible
with the Federal Rules and should not be applied in federal tri-
als")53 altered the standards for scientific expert testimony at
the federal level.
Daubert involved the admissibility of expert testimony on
the effects of a certain drug, Bendectin, offered by the plaintiffs
at trial.5 4 The evidence was excluded by the trial court and the
Ninth Circuit on appeal, on the basis of the Frye "general ac-
ceptance" test; the Supreme Court vacated and remanded.
55
When confronted with proposed scientific expert testimony,
Daubert requires the trial judge to determine if the expert will
testify as to "scientific knowledge that... will assist the trier of
fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. '"56 To do this,
the judge must "make a preliminary assessment of whether the
50. See People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1994) (holding that Frye would
remain the standard in New York). The holding in Daubert has been codified by
the 2000 Amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
51. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
52. ROGER PARK, DAVID LEONARD, & STEVEN GOLDBERG, EVIDENCE LAW 517
(2d ed. 2004). Federal Rule of Evidence 702 currently reads:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educa-
tion, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied
the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
53. Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 589.
54. Id. at 582. There were over thirty published studies on the drug, none of
which concluded that it actually caused birth defects. Id. However, the plaintiffs
wanted eight expert witnesses to testify that, based on the results of animal stud-
ies and re-evaluations of the prior published studies, Bendectin did cause birth
defects. Id. at 583.
55. Id. at 583-85, 598.
56. Id. at 592.
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testimony's underlying reasoning or methodology is scientifi-
cally valid and properly can be applied to the facts at issue."57
This "preliminary assessment" is essentially within the dis-
cretion of the trial judge.58 The Court, while stating that it does
not "presume to set out a definitive checklist or test," neverthe-
less suggested certain criteria that the judge should consider
when deciding to allow scientific expert testimony.5 9 First, has
the theory been tested?60 Second, has it been subjected to peer
review?61 Third, is there a known or potential error rate?62 Fi-
nally, is there general acceptance in the appropriate scientific
community?63
The Court states that the "test" it articulated is a flexible
one, where the "overarching subject is the scientific validity...
of principles [underlying] a proposed submission," and where
the focus is on "methodology.'" 64 This is the key distinction be-
tween Frye and Daubert: "the single most important 'guidepost'
contained in Daubert is the Court's directive to judges to ac-
tively evaluate scientific evidence." 65 Daubert has turned the
trial judge into a "gatekeeper" of sorts, who has the final say on
whether the proffered scientific testimony is valid and reliable.
C. Frye or Daubert: Does it Matter?
One ever-popular question among commentators is
whether the outcome is really affected by which standard for
57. Id. at 593.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 593-94.
62. Id. at 594.
63. Id. Note how the Frye "general acceptance" standard is now one of several
factors to be considered by the trial court.
64. Id. at 594-95. One commentator emphasizes, however, that criticisms of a
study's methodology go to its weight, rather than its admissibility, and is a ques-
tion of fact for the jury rather than a question of law for the court. "Daubert re-
quires only scientific validity for admissibility, not scientific precision." Robert
Murrian, The Admissibility of Expert Eyewitness Testimony Under the Federal
Rules, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 379, 384-85 (1998) (quoting United States v. Bonds, 12
F.3d 540, 558 (6th Cir. 1993)).
65. David Faigman, Mapping the Labyrinth of Scientific Evidence, 46 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 555, 555 (1995).
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the admission of scientific evidence is used.66 More important
for the topic of this Note, does the admissibility of expert testi-
mony on eyewitness identification hinge on what standard is
used?
Federal courts applying the Daubert standard remain di-
vided on whether they will allow expert testimony on eyewit-
ness and cross-racial identifications. Some district courts hold
that expert testimony will be admitted under the facts of a par-
ticular case,67 and some appellate courts have reversed a dis-
trict court's exclusion of the testimony under the stringent
abuse of discretion standard.68 However, there are also many
appellate courts that will sustain a district court's exclusion of
the expert testimony at the trial level. 69 It is also worth point-
66. See, e.g., Edward Cheng & Albert Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A
Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471 (2005). The au-
thors' conclusion is that "the skirmishing between the champions of Frye and
Daubert yields few benefits and creates more confusion than anything else." Id. at
503-04.
67. See, e.g., United States v. Norwood, 939 F. Supp. 1132 (D. N.J. 1996) (ex-
pert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification was admissible in a
caijacking prosecution); United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999)
(a psychologist's expert testimony on cross-racial identification was necessary to
assist the jury where a white witness identified a black defendant and was there-
fore admissible). Hines emphasizes that "even if the inferences may be drawn by
the lay juror, expert testimony may be admissible as an 'aid' in that enterprise."
Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 64. See also United States v. Sullivan, 246 F. Supp. 2d
696, 700 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (holding that a expert testimony on eyewitness identifica-
tion was admissible and that there was a trend toward allowing the admission of
such evidence in federal courts); United States v. Beck, 393 F.3d 1088, 1092 n.2
(9th Cir. 2005) (noting that the district court had allowed expert testimony on eye-
witness identification).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Smithers, 263 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding
that the district court abused its discretion where it excluded eyewitness expert
testimony without conducting a full Daubert hearing). See also United States v.
Mathis, 264 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that the exclusion of the expert testi-
mony was an abuse of discretion); United States v. Langan, 263 F.3d 613 (6th Cir.
2001) (although expert testimony on eyewitness identification was held not per se
inadmissible, in that case it should have been excluded because the specific theory
the expert would testify to had not been proven).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 1996) (where it was
not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to determine under the facts of the
case that defendant had not satisfied Daubert where he did not present enough
information to determine scientific validity); United States v. Hicks, 103 F.3d 837
(9th Cir. 1996) (even if the proposed testimony on eyewitness identification satis-
fied Daubert, the trial court still had the discretion to exclude it as unhelpful);
United States v. Harris, 955 F.2d 532 (4th Cir. 1993) (excluding expert testimony
on cross-racial identification is within the discretion of the trial judge); United
13
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ing out that not all courts agree on the reasons for exclusion:
some indicate in their decisions that the testimony will be ex-
cluded under the facts of the case at bar, implying that it is
likely these courts are excluding the evidence because they feel
it will not assist the trier of fact rather than out of concern
about the validity of the underlying science, 70 while others do
question the science itself.7' As will be discussed infra with re-
spect to New York, courts which apply the Frye standard also
remain divided on the issue of admissibility.
It is certainly true that there are differences between the
two tests, key among them the role of the judge. Under Frye,
judges will generally defer to the scientific community and al-
low the evidence to be admitted if there is general acceptance of
the theory in the relevant community. 72 A judge determining
admissibility under the Frye standard does not himself evaluate
the science; rather, he looks at the scientific community's evalu-
ation of the science to determine general acceptance. In con-
trast, the Daubert judge is a "gatekeeper" who actively
evaluates the evidence rather than relying on the opinion of the
relevant community and determines admissibility under sev-
eral criteria, of which "general acceptance" is only one.73
One of the main criticisms of Frye is that it is "unreceptive
to new science."74 If a judge cannot admit science until it is gen-
erally accepted in the field, there is a period of time in which
theories which ultimately will be accepted cannot be admissible
in court since they have not had the opportunity to be fully eval-
uated and accepted by the relevant community. Daubert, on the
other hand, allows the judge to look at all the available studies
and data to determine for himself if the science meets the Rule
702 criteria.
States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 1994) (it was not an abuse of discretion to
exclude expert testimony on eyewitness identification where the jury instructions
were comprehensive enough to address many of the same factors).
70. See FED. R. EVID. 702 ("[i]f scientific ... knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue .... "). See generally
Hicks, 103 F.3d 837; Rincon, 28 F.3d 921.
71. See generally Langan, 263 F.3d 613; Kime, 99 F.3d 870.
72. PARK ET AL., supra note 52, at 522.
73. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
74. PARK ET AL., supra note 52, at 523 (internal citations omitted).
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At least one commentator has suggested that Frye should
be inapplicable to expert testimony on eyewitness identification
for precisely that reason: since Frye is concerned with weeding
out novel scientific theories or "junk science" that have not
gained general acceptance in the current field, it should not ap-
ply in this area since the relevant theories are not novel.7 5
Much of the work in the area of eyewitness expert testimony
dates back to the late 1970s and was comprehensively written
about by psychologist Dr. Elizabeth F. Loftus at that time.7 6
This commentator also points out several other areas where ex-
pert testimony is so established in New York that a Frye hear-
ing is deemed unnecessary and argues that eyewitness expert
testimony should be given the same treatment. 77
In terms of actual admissibility, it seems to matter little
whether Frye or Daubert is used.78 While the use of Daubert, at
least in theory, would produce uniform standards for admissi-
bility, federal courts which use the Daubert/FRE 702 standard
yield results as inconsistent as those obtained by New York
courts using the Frye standard. And while scientific research
on eyewitness expert testimony under the Daubert standard
would be evaluated by the judge rather than by determining
whether there is general acceptance in the field, the trial judge
has the discretion under the Daubert standard to exclude the
evidence anyway by determining it would not assist the trier of
fact.79
III. History of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness
Identification in New York State (Before
People v. Lee)
Before the Court of Appeals' 2001 decision in People v.
Lee,80 expert testimony on eyewitness identification had a
75. Scott Woller, Rethinking the Role of Expert Testimony Regarding the Reli-
ability of Eyewitness Identifications in New York, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 323, 348-
49 (2003/2004).
76. See generally LoFTus, supra note 28.
77. Woller, supra note 75, at 349. Woller cites several New York cases in
which experts on rape trauma syndrome, battered woman's syndrome, and sexu-
ally abused child syndrome were allowed to testify without a Frye hearing.
78. See, e.g., Cheng & Yoon, supra note 66.
79. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
80. 750 N.E.2d 63 (N.Y. 2001).
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checkered history in New York. Beginning with People v. Val-
entine8l in 1976 and continuing through People v. Drake8 2 in
2001, various New York courts have dealt with issues relating
to the admissibility of such expert testimony and have reached
varying results.
Before Lee, many New York courts held that expert testi-
mony on eyewitness identification was not admissible. For ex-
ample, in Valentine, the Appellate Division held that "expert
opinions were not necessary to enable the jury to comprehend
the potential for unreliability." 3 In People v. Brown, the court
also denied the use of an expert on eyewitness identification.8 4
People v. Mooney, the first Court of Appeals case to consider the
admissibility of such expert testimony, did not resolve the issue;
however, the majority affirmed the defendant's conviction be-
cause the decision whether to admit the testimony was within
the discretion of the trial court and, absent an abuse of that
discretion, the court did not need to reach the substantive
issue.8 5
In some cases, however, New York courts have admitted ex-
pert testimony on eyewitness identification. The court in People
v. Lawson granted the defendant's motion to admit expert testi-
mony on the issue of cross-racial identification because the tes-
timony met the requirements of reliability, relevancy, and was
a proper subject for expert testimony.86 Similarly, People v.
81. 385 N.Y.S.2d 545 (App. Div. 1976).
82. 728 N.Y.S.2d 636 (Sup. Ct. 2001), affd, 850 N.E.2d 630 (N.Y. 2006). See
discussion infra Part VI for the discussion of the Court of Appeals decision in
Drake.
83. Valentine, 385 N.Y.S.2d 545, 546 (the testimony would "trespass on the
jury's domain.").
84. People v. Brown, 479 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. 1984). Interestingly, this is
the only case I have found before Lee which expressly uses the Frye "general ac-
ceptance" standard to deny the testimony.
85. People v. Mooney, 559 N.E.2d 1274 (N.Y. 1990). "On this appeal, we need
not decide whether the expert testimony sought to be presented was of the type
that could, as a matter of law, properly be excluded." Id. at 1274. Mooney is most
distinctive for its strong dissent by Judge Kaye, in which she countered all the trial
court's reasons for exclusion (including that the testimony was unreliable, not gen-
erally accepted, and would usurp the role of the jury). She also sharply criticized
the majority for their unwillingness to review the discretionary decision of the trial
court. Id. at 1275-78.
86. People v. Lawson, 463 N.Y.S.2d 99 (Sup. Ct. 1983). In Lawson, the eye-
witness at trial was Japanese and the defendant was Hispanic. The court allowed
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Brooks held that expert opinions on eyewitness testimony
"when limited to an explication of the factors which studies
have shown are relevant to making a reliable identification [are
proper]... and will enhance the ability of the jury to reach its
decision ... 8. 17 One of the areas mentioned by the court in
Brooks that would be appropriate for expert testimony is the
"cross-racial aspect of the identification." s8 Other cases in
which expert testimony on eyewitness identification was al-
lowed include People v. Lewis,s 9 People v. Beckford,90 and People
v. Drake.91
IV. People v. Lee
People v. Lee92 was the first case since Mooney in which the
Court of Appeals considered the admissibility of expert testi-
mony on eyewitness identification. In Lee, the defendant was
accused of stealing a car. There was an eyewitness, who spoke
with the defendant before the crime occurred in a well-lit area
and later identified the defendant on two separate occasions-
the defendant's expert to testify generally as to studies and methodology, not the
accuracy of this particular eyewitness' identification. Id.
87. People v. Brooks, 490 N.Y.S.2d 692, 694-95 (Sup. Ct. 1985). The court in
Brooks points out that the Court of Appeals' standard for the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony was whether "it would help to clarify an issue calling for profes-
sional or technical knowledge, possessed by the expert, and beyond the ken of the
typical juror." Id. at 697 (quoting DeLong v. County of Erie, 457 N.E.2d 717, 722
(N.Y. 1983)).
88. Id. at 694.
89. 520 N.Y.S.2d 125 (Sup. Ct. 1987). The court in Lewis allowed expert testi-
mony on eyewitness identification under the specific circumstances of that case (an
artificially lit parking lot, a nighttime identification, and a short identification
time). Id.
90. 532 N.Y.S.2d 462 (Sup. Ct. 1988). In Beckford, the court allowed a psy-
chology professor, an expert in the field of memory and perception, to testify as the
stress of identification, which scientific research demonstrated affected memory,
as well as the lack of correlation between witness confidence and accuracy. "Ad-
mission of such testimony would not usurp the jury's function in determining the
guilt or innocence of the defendant. They can ultimately reject or accept such testi-
mony." Id. at 464.
91. 728 N.Y.S.2d 636 (Sup. Ct. 2001). The court in Drake also allowed expert
testimony on eyewitness identification. "The jury can be greatly assisted by an
expert's explanation of factors that scientific research has shown can profoundly
influence a witness' ability to accurately identify." Id. at 639. The court repro-
duced the same list of factors from Brooks, which included cross-racial
identification.
92. 750 N.E.2d 63 (N.Y. 2001).
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once in a photo array, and once in a police lineup.93 Before trial,
the defendant moved to introduce the testimony of an expert on
eyewitness testimony. This motion was denied by the trial
judge.94 The defendant was convicted at trial and appealed, ar-
guing that the expert testimony should have been admitted at
trial.95
The Court of Appeals held that "while such expert testi-
mony [on the reliability of eyewitness testimony] is not inadmis-
sible per se, the decision whether to admit it rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court."96 The reviewing court looks at the
decision of the trial judge to exclude in order to determine only
whether there was an abuse of discretion; absent such an abuse,
the reviewing court will affirm the exclusion.97
The most important statement made in Lee is "despite the
fact that jurors may be familiar from their own experience with
factors relevant to the reliability of eyewitness observation and
identification, it cannot be said that psychological studies re-
garding the accuracy of an identification are within the ken of
the ordinary juror."98 Since some courts' rationale for excluding
expert testimony on eyewitness identification (especially in the
area of cross-racial identification) is that the factors affecting
reliability are within the experience of the ordinary juror,99 the
statement in Lee potentially calls this reasoning into question.
However, while Lee is important for the propositions that
expert testimony on eyewitness identification can be admitted
by the trial court and that factors affecting identification are
not necessarily beyond the understanding of the ordinary juror,
the standard of review to be employed makes it unlikely that a
trial court's refusal to admit the expert testimony will be over-
turned on appeal absent a blatant abuse of discretion.
93. Id. at 65.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 65-66.
96. Id. at 65.
97. Id. at 66. "It is for the trial court in the first instance to determine when
jurors are able to draw conclusions from the evidence based on their day-to-day
experience, their common observation and their knowledge, and when they would
be benefited by the specialized knowledge of an expert witness." Id. (quoting Peo-
ple v. Cronin, 458 N.E.2d 351, 352 (N.Y. 1983)).
98. Id. at 66.
99. See, e.g., People v. Carrieri, 777 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 2004); People v.
Valentine, 385 N.Y.S.2d 545 (App. Div. 1976).
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V. From Lee to Carrieri
There are few New York criminal cases after Lee which
deal with the admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness
identification, and fewer still which involve cross-racial identifi-
cations. This section discusses five of those cases, four of which
deal with cross-racial identification. 00
In People v. Radcliffe, the defendant was charged with at-
tempted murder. In a pre-trial motion, he asked for permission
to call an expert witness on eyewitness identification. 10 1 Specif-
ically, the expert would testify as to the cross-racial nature of
the identification. 0 2 The court, after noting that the law in New
York is not clear on the "parameters of expert identification,"
set forth five criteria that an application to submit such testi-
mony should contain:
An application to admit expert identification testimony
should: (1) to the extent known, set forth the pertinent alleged
facts of the identification and any corroborative evidence; (2) set
forth the name and qualifications of the witness and the 'prof-
fered' testimony; (3) correlate the proffered testimony with the
facts of the case to demonstrate the relevance of the expert testi-
mony; (4) explain whether the testimony involves 'novel scientific
theories and techniques,' and if it does, include an offer of proof as
to its general acceptance by the relevant scientific community;
and (5) explain why the testimony is warranted if an existing
standard jury instruction ... appear to cover the area of the prof-
fered expert testimony. 0 3
Although holding that defendant's application was incom-
plete under this standard, the court granted defendant leave to
amend so as to comply with the court's criteria. 0 4
Radcliffe is significant for two reasons: first, because it sets
forth some type of criteria from which to judge the admissibility
of expert testimony in this area, and second, for the court's
100. These five cases are: People v. Radcliffe, 743 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sup. Ct.
2002); People v. Smith, 743 N.Y.S.2d 246 (Sup. Ct. 2002); People v. Legrand, 747
N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 2002); People v. Smith, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 255 (Sup.
Ct. Mar. 26, 2004)); People v. Carrieri, 777 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 2004).
101. Radcliffe, 743 N.Y.S.2d 229, 230.
102. Id. at 233. The defendant was black while the victim/eyewitness was
Hispanic.
103. Id. at 232.
104. Id. at 234.
20071 451
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statement that "'cross-racial identification' is an area not cov-
ered by the current standard jury instruction and is an area
that may lend itself to expert testimony."10 5 Radcliffe correctly
realizes that, since the Court of Appeals in Lee held that an ap-
pellate court can only review a trial court's decision to exclude
expert testimony for abuse of discretion, some type of procedu-
ral standards must exist for a trial judge to properly consider
the testimony's admissibility.10 6 If each court relies on its own
criteria to decide admissibility, the law will remain unsettled
and inconsistent; as well, criminal defendants will continue to
be deprived of an opportunity to attack the credibility of eyewit-
nesses. It is also significant that Radcliffe does not foreclose the
possibility of expert testimony on the issue of cross-racial iden-
tification, even though the average juror may be aware of some
of the factors that affect eyewitness testimony in that
situation. 107
The court in People v. Smith rejected the Radcliffe criteria,
finding that such a standard was too strict and put a burden on
the defense that the prosecution would not have when seeking
to introduce their own experts. 08 In Smith, the defendant was
charged with three robberies. There were two eyewitnesses,
one of who was able to pick defendant out of both a photo array
and a lineup; the other witness was only able to identify defen-
dant in a police lineup. 109 At trial, defendant intended to intro-
duce the testimony of an expert witness in the field of memory
and perception who would testify as to the cross-racial nature of
the witness identification; the prosecution made a pre-trial mo-
tion to preclude the expert witness' testimony. 10
The Smith court began by noting that a pre-trial Frye hear-
ing to determine whether the proffered expert testimony was
105. Id. at 233. The court also states cites People v. Lee for the proposition
that, "expert identification testimony, while confirming something a typical juror
may know or be told in jury instructions, may nonetheless be required in order to
add specialized information.., that is beyond the ken of the juror and relevant to
the facts at hand." Id. at 231.
106. Id. at 232.
107. Id. at 233.
108. People v. Smith, 743 N.Y.S.2d 246, 250 (Sup. Ct. 2002).
109. Id. at 247. Four other witnesses were unable to identify Smith in a police
lineup. The case against Smith rested entirely on the identification by the first
two witnesses. Id.
110. Id.
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"generally accepted" by the scientific community was unneces-
sary in this situation, since the theory at issue was not novel
and was supported by a wide range of studies."' Other New
York courts which previously considered the same issue had
also concluded that testimony met the Frye test. 1 2
Therefore, the question the Smith court considered was
whether the expert testimony on eyewitness identification
should be admitted in this particular case.11 3 While calling the
criteria developed by the Radcliffe court "thoughtful,"1 4 the
Smith court disagreed with this proposed standard for several
reasons, most notably the fact that since "a prosecution fre-
quently proceeds without any description of the complain-
ant,"1 5 a defendant will be unable to meet the third criteria of
the Radcliffe test ("correlat[ion of] the proffered testimony with
the facts of the case to demonstrate the relevance of the expert
testimony")" 6 without "guesswork. 11 7 The court in Smith also
pointed out that the Radcliffe criteria impose another burden
on defendant- he must "explain why the testimony is warranted
if an existing standard jury instruction would appear to cover
the area of the proffered testimony."" 8 The Smith court noted
that the Court of Appeals in Lee makes it clear that the real
question is whether the expert testimony would be helpful to
the jury." 9 The court concluded that the opportunity for cross-
111. Id. at 248 ("Where, as here, it is clearly demonstrated that certain recur-
ring phenomena and derivative patterns of human behavior have been observed,
studied, recorded, analyzed, and published in academic literature and pervasively
subjected to peer review, the court will permit conclusions and opinions offered by
a recognized expert in the field of study without the necessity of a pre-trial Frye
hearing.").
112. Id. The court cited People v. Drake, 728 N.Y.S.2d 636 (Sup. Ct. 2001);
People v. Beckford, 532 N.Y.S.2d 462 (Sup. Ct. 1988); People v. Lewis, 520 N.Y.S.2d
125 (Sup. Ct. 1987); and People v. Lewis, 490 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Sup. Ct. 1985) to sup-
port this statement.
113. Smith, 743 N.Y.S.2d 246, 249.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 251.
116. People v. Radcliffe, 743 N.Y.S.2d 229, 232 (Sup. Ct. 2002).
117. Smith, 743 N.Y.S.2d 246, 251. The court believed the limited pre-trial
discovery accorded to a defendant would make such correlation difficult, if not im-
possible. Id.
118. Id.
119. People v. Lee, 750 N.E.2d 63, 66 (N.Y. 2001) ("courts should be wary not
to exclude such [expert] testimony merely because, to some degree, it invades the
jury's province").
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examination and jury instructions "are not alternatives to testi-
mony by a defense expert,"'120 and denied the prosecution's mo-
tion to exclude the defendant's expert.
The decision in Smith is interesting for two reasons: first,
because it implicitly accepts the "general acceptability" of ex-
pert testimony on eyewitness identification, and second, be-
cause, while it rejects the Radcliffe criteria as too strict, it does
not offer any alternate standard for admissibility.
Four months after Smith, another New York County Su-
preme Court rejected the premise that such expert testimony
satisfies the Frye "general acceptability" test and noted with ap-
proval the procedure set out by Radcliffe.121 In People v.
Legrand, the defendant was charged with second-degree mur-
der. 122 After the first trial ended in a mistrial, the defendant
moved for permission to introduce expert testimony on eyewit-
ness identification. 123 After a hearing, the trial court denied de-
fendant's motion. 124
The Legrand court began by analyzing the only two post-
Lee trial court decisions to deal with the admissibility of expert
eyewitness testimony: Radcliffe and Smith. Legrand cites the
Radcliffe criteria with approval, noting that the procedure does
much to provide an admissibility standard in an area which re-
mained unsettled in New York.125 In contrast, the Legrand
court rejected the conclusion in Smith that this type of expert
testimony is generally accepted, 126 and noted that the cases
120. Smith, 743 N.Y.S.2d 246, 252.
121. People v. Legrand, 747 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 2002).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 736-37. The defendant was actually arrested in connection with a
burglary charge in 1998, and was subsequently linked to a 1991 homicide. Three
of the witnesses to the 1991 murder identified defendant in a photo array, and one
also identified him in a police lineup. Id. at 737. The expert testimony defendant
wished to introduce at the second trial related to the confidence-accuracy correla-
tion, weapon focus, and "post-event information and confidence malleability." Id.
at 736. Cross-racial identification was not an issue in this case.
124. Id. at 737. This ruling was recently overturned by the New York Court of
Appeals as an abuse of discretion. People v. Legrand, No. 39, 2007 N.Y. LEXIS 325
(N.Y. Mar. 27, 2007). See Conclusion, infra.
125. People v. Legrand, 747 N.Y.S.2d 733, 739 (Sup. Ct. 2002).
126. Id. "Smith concluded that there was nothing novel about the proposed
testimony, implicitly accepting its general acceptability." Id. The court goes on to
say that this "ignored" the Court of Appeals statement in Lee that this issue "re-
mains . . . unresolved . . . in this State." Id.
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Smith cited for this proposition did not admit the testimony af-
ter an explicit finding that Frye was satisfied. 127
What is interesting about the decision in Legrand is that it
appears to consider as settled the issue of whether this type of
expert testimony is beyond the knowledge and experience of the
average juror. Legrand cites Lee for the proposition that such
testimony is not within the "ken of the jury" and considers this
prong of the Frye test satisfied. 128 Although the Legrand court
ultimately excluded the testimony, it did so because it believed
the "general acceptability" prong had not been satisfied as to
the specific eyewitness factors to which defendant's expert
would testify.129
The fourth case after Lee to deal with the admissibility of
expert testimony on eyewitness identification is People v.
Smith.130 In Smith, the defendant was indicted for murder in
the second degree. There were three eyewitnesses to the crime,
all of whom were able to pick the defendant out of a police
lineup.' 3 ' The defendant made a pre-trial motion to introduce
the testimony of an expert witness on eyewitness identification,
who was prepared to testify as to various factors affecting iden-
tification, one of which was the cross-racial nature of the identi-
127. Id. at 739 n.3. This is also true for the cases which rejected the testi-
mony (these cases tended to reject the testimony on the basis that it was within
the knowledge and experience of the average juror). Id. at 739 n.4. However, the
Legrand court fails to mention People v. Brown, 479 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. 1984),
which did mention the Frye general acceptability standard as the reason for its
rejection.
128. Id. at 742 ("Moreover, there is no need for me to determine whether the
evidence is beyond the ken of the jury, since this question apparently has been put
to rest by the statement in Lee, that although 'jurors may be familiar from their
own experience with factors relevant to the reliability of eyewitness observations
and identifications, it cannot be said that psychological studies regarding the accu-
racy of an identification are within the ken of the typical juror."' (quoting People v.
Lee, 750 N.E.2d 63, 66 (N.Y. 2001)).
129. Id. at 742-57. The First Department recently affirmed the lower court
decision in People v. Legrand, stating that the record supported the trial court's
determination that the expert testimony offered was not accepted by the scientific
community and that it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude it. 814 N.Y.S.2d
37, 38 (App. Div. 2006). However, the Court of Appeals reversed the First Depart-
ment in late March 2007, holding that the trial court decision was an abuse of
discretion. No. 39, 2007 N.Y. LEXIS 325 (N.Y. Mar. 27, 2007).
130. 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 255 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 26, 2004). This case is unre-
lated to the first Smith case referred to supra note 108.
131. Id. at *1. One of the eyewitnesses also picked defendant out of a photo
array.
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fication.132 After a hearing, the court denied without opinion
the motion as to several of the factors, including cross-racial
identification. Although a Frye hearing was held as to the re-
maining factors, the court ultimately denied the motion to ad-
mit the testimony as to these factors as well. 133
The court in Smith, as in Legrand, assumed that the prof-
fered testimony was beyond the knowledge and experience of
the average juror. 34 The only remaining question was
"whether the proffered expert testimony is considered generally
reliable in the relevant scientific community." 35 The Smith
court therefore spent the remainder of its opinion assessing the
available data, and seemed to focus on the methodology of the
studies rather than its general acceptance in the community. 36
It is worth noting, however, that at least one commentator
has stated that the methodology of a study is relevant to the
weight the results will be given by the jury rather than its ad-
missibility.' 37 All Frye requires the trial judge to do when as-
sessing admissibility is to determine whether the theory is
generally accepted in the relevant scientific community; both
the Smith and Legrand courts seem to determine the admissi-
bility, at least in part, on their personal assessment and rejec-
tion of the scientific studies' methodology. Such an inquiry,
while perhaps appropriate in a court which adheres to Daubert,
is inappropriate in a court which must apply the Frye standard.
In its conclusion, the Smith court states, "although not
before this court, the area of cross racial identification may in-
deed be ripe for expert testimony." 38 Notwithstanding this
comment, one of the next cases to consider the issue, People v.
Carrieri,139 excluded such expert testimony.
132. Id. The defendant was black. Presumably, at least one of the witnesses
was not, but the opinion does not specify the race of the eyewitnesses.
133. Id. at *1-2, 11.
134. Id. at *3-4.
135. Id. at *4.
136. Id. at *4-11. For example, the court critiques the number of participants
in the Kassin study, the fact that many studies take place in a laboratory setting
with mock juries, and the characteristics of the participants. The court in Legrand
assessed the available studies in a very similar manner. See People v. Legrand,
747 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 2002).
137. Murrian, supra note 64, at 384-85.
138. Smith, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 255, *11.
139. 777 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 2004).
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In Carrieri, the defendant was charged with robbery. 140
There was one witness who identified the defendant as the rob-
ber, and this identification was cross-racial in nature. 4 1 At
trial, the defendant filed a motion to call an expert witness who
would testify as to the accuracy of cross-racial eyewitness
identification. 142
The court first found that a Frye hearing would be called for
in this case, as the scientific knowledge regarding expert testi-
mony on cross-racial identifications was "novel."143 The court
cites the 1999 New Jersey case State v. Cromedy for the proposi-
tion that scientists disagree about the extent to which own-race
bias affects eyewitness identification and its application to spe-
cific racial groups. 44 One thing that is significant about this
conclusion is that the court in Carrieri did not conduct any of its
own research or review any of the studies which existed (as the
courts in Radcliffe,145 Smith,146 and Legrand147 had) to reach it.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 627-28. The defendant also wanted a jury instruction that would
allow the jury to take the cross-racial nature of the identification into account dur-
ing deliberations. Id.
143. Id. at 628.
144. Id. (citing State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 461-62 (N.J. 1999)). In
Cromedy, the defendant was convicted of sexual assault. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457,
460. The eyewitness in the case was the victim, who initially gave police a descrip-
tion of her attacker but was unable to pick him out of a photo line-up. Id. at 459.
She later saw an individual on the street she believed to be the attacker, notified
police, and later identified him in a police line-up. Id. Eyewitness testimony was
the only evidence offered at trial, since blood and saliva samples did not link defen-
dant to the crime. Id. at 459-60. Defendant requested a jury instruction on the
nature of the cross-racial identification (the defendant was black and the witness
white), which was denied. Id. at 460. On appeal, the state Supreme Court re-
versed the conviction, holding that the jury instruction should have been given. Id.
at 459. More importantly, the state Supreme Court held that expert testimony on
cross racial identification was within the common knowledge and understanding of
the jurors and was inadmissible per se under New Jersey law. Id. at 467-68. At
the time, Rule 702 of the New Jersey Rules of Evidence required that:
(1) the intended testimony must concern a subject matter that is beyond the
ken of the average juror; (2) the field testified to must be at a state of the art
such that an expert's testimony could be sufficiently reliable; and (3) the
witness must have sufficient expertise to offer the intended testimony.
State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 208 (1984); see also Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 467-68;
compare Smith v. State, 880 A.2d 288, 296 (Md. 2005) (finding that the science
regarding the fallibility of cross-racial eyewitness identifications was sound).
145. 743 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sup. Ct. 2002).
146. 743 N.Y.S.2d 246 (Sup. Ct. 2002).
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Instead, the court relied on a five-year old case from another
jurisdiction to reach the conclusion that the underlying science
was not currently accepted. 148 This decision seems to conflict
with pre-Lee cases like Brooks, Beckford, and Drake which iden-
tify the cross-racial nature of the identification as a factor that
expert testimony may be appropriate to clarify or explain. 149
The Carrieri court also stated that even if the science is
generally accepted, the question of whether the evidence is be-
yond the experience of the ordinary juror still remained. In ad-
dition to conflicting with the Court of Appeals' decision in
People v. Lee (where the court noted that "it cannot be said that
psychological studies regarding the accuracy of an identification
are within the ken of the ordinary juror"),150 this conclusion ig-
nores the cases which came after Lee, including Legrand and
Smith.' 51 These post-Lee cases either explicitly or implicitly ac-
cepted the proposition that expert testimony on eyewitness
identification does not rely on knowledge within the experience
of the average juror. 5 2
VI. The Court of Appeals Weighs In: People v. Drake and
People v. Young
In May 2006, the New York Court of Appeals decided two
cases in which they attempted to provide guidance to the lower
courts concerning the scope of their discretion in excluding or
allowing expert testimony on eyewitness identification. 153 The
facts of the first, People v. Drake, are discussed supra; recall
147. 747 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 2002).
148. People v. Carrieri, 777 N.Y.S.2d 627, 628 (Sup. Ct. 2004). It is also worth
noting that Cromedy was decided in 1999, two years before the Court of Appeals in
People v. Lee held that psychological studies on factors dealing with eyewitness
testimony are not necessarily within the experience of the average juror. People v.
Lee, 750 N.E.2d 63, 66 (N.Y. 2001).
149. See People v. Brooks, 490 N.Y.S.2d 692, 694-95 (Sup. Ct. 1985); People v.
Beckford, 532 N.Y.S.2d 462, 464 (Sup. Ct. 1988); People v. Drake, 728 N.Y.S.2d
636, 639 (Sup. Ct. 2001).
150. Lee, 750 N.E.2d 63, 66.
151. People v. Legrand, 747 N.Y.S.2d 733, 742-57 (Sup. Ct. 2002); People v.
Smith, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 255 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 26, 2004).
152. Legrand, 747 N.Y.S.2d 733, 742-57; Smith, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 255,
at *3-4.
153. People v. Drake, 850 N.E.2d 630 (N.Y. 2006); People v. Young, 850
N.E.2d 623 (N.Y. 2006).
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that the trial court had allowed an expert witness on eyewitness
identification to testify.154 The Court of Appeals dealt largely
with an issue relating to the jury charge and the weight the jury
was allowed to give the expert testimony,15 5 but stated that the
trial court had allowed the expert testimony "as courts are en-
couraged to do in appropriate cases," 156 and referred to their de-
cision in People v. Young, issued on the same day.
In People v. Young, the defendant was arrested on robbery
charges stemming from a home invasion in which one of the vic-
tims subsequently identified the defendant in a line-up (after
first failing to do so in a photo array). 157 At trial, 15  the defen-
dant sought to introduce expert testimony from an expert who
studied the factors which affected eyewitness identification ac-
curacy; one of the factors the expert proposed to testify on was
other-race bias and cross-racial identification (the defendant in
Young was black and the victim was white). 59 The evidence
was excluded by the trial court "in the exercise of its discretion,"
and the defendant was once again convicted of robbery and
burglary. 60
The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's conviction, hold-
ing that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding
the expert's testimony. 61 In reaching the conclusion that, in ac-
cordance with People v. Lee, the trial court had the discretion to
admit or exclude the evidence and that it was not an abuse in
this case to exclude it, the Court of Appeals considered two fac-
tors: "[Tihe extent to which the research findings discussed by
Brigham [the expert] were relevant to Mrs. Sykes' [the victim]
identification of defendant; and the extent to which that identi-
154. People v. Drake, 728 N.Y.S.2d 636 (Sup. Ct. 2001).
155. People v. Drake, 850 N.E.2d 630, 632-33 (N.Y. 2006).
156. Id. at 631.
157. People v. Young, 850 N.E.2d 623, 624 (N.Y. 2006).
158. This trial was actually the defendant's second: in his first, defendant
was convicted and the conviction later overturned on appeal because certain evi-
dence, including the victim's lineup identification, followed from an arrest without
probable cause. Id. An independent source hearing held after the reversal found
the victim could identify the defendant based on her observations during the
break-in itself, and defendant was re-tried. Id. at 624-25.
159. Id. at 625.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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fication was corroborated by other evidence. ' 162 While the first
factor weighed in favor of admitting the testimony, the identifi-
cation was so strongly corroborated that the trial court could
have reasonably concluded that the proffered testimony would
be of "minor importance. " 163
Judge Smith dissented in Young, stating, "[t]he majority's
ruling misses the opportunity to hold that here, as a matter of
law, where eyewitness identification is attenuated and possibly
tainted, and corroborating evidence is weak, courts should allow
expert testimony concerning eyewitness identification.' 64
VII. Applying Young: People v. Williams
The question of the status of expert testimony on cross-ra-
cial eyewitness identifications in New York remains after Drake
and Young. Although these cases, particularly Young, have pro-
vided trial courts with some guidance as to when exclusion may
constitute an abuse of discretion, Judge Smith's dissent raises a
good point: if in the situation he outlines, the Court of Appeals
would not necessarily find an abuse of discretion, in what situa-
tion would they? 65 The majority opinion states that the trial
court clearly could have admitted the expert testimony in this
case, but that exclusion was not an abuse of discretion.' 66 Al-
though Young gives some guidance to lower courts as to when
exclusion might not be acceptable, the opinion seems to imply
that so long as there is some evidence corroborating the identifi-
cation, exclusion will not be an abuse of discretion.
It is also worth noting that Young seems to re-frame the
longstanding debate over why courts exclude such evidence. As
discussed supra, trial courts in New York which exclude expert
testimony on cross-racial eyewitness identification tend to do so
162. Id. at 626.
163. Id. The Court of Appeals went on to state that "if this case turned en-
tirely on an uncorroborated eyewitness identification, it might well have been an
abuse of discretion to deny the jury the benefit of Brigham's opinions." Id. at 626-
27.
164. Id. at 629. Judge Smith also dissented in Drake.
165. The Court of Appeals, in their March 2007 decision in People v. Legrand,
does adopt Judge Smith's suggestion in situations where there is "little or no cor-
roborating evidence," but fails to provide guidance on exactly what "little" corrobo-
ration might consist of. No. 39, 2007 N.Y. LEXIS 325 at *2 (N.Y. Mar. 27, 2007).
166. Id. at 626.
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for one of two reasons: the science underlying the testimony is
not sound and reliable, or the testimony covers factors within
the ordinary knowledge and experience of the lay juror. While
not specifying exactly what factors they are referring to, the
Court of Appeals in Young noted that some of the expert's pro-
posed testimony concerned aspects of identification which are
"'counter-intuitive' [sic]-or, at least not so obvious or well-
known that ordinary jurors would not benefit from hearing
them," specifically that "jurors may also find it useful to know
Brigham's general conclusion that human recollection of the
faces of strangers is, on the whole, rather poor.' 1 67 Such a state-
ment goes far in laying to rest the lingering concern of lower
courts after Lee that expert testimony on eyewitness identifica-
tion is within the knowledge and experience of the average ju-
ror. The Court of Appeals also appears to assume that the
science underlying the expert's proposed testimony is sound, as
it did not mention this as a basis upon which the trial court
could have reasonably excluded the evidence.
What then is the justification for exclusion of expert testi-
mony on eyewitness identification after Young? The Court of
Appeals seems to frame the issue in terms of how likely it is
that the eyewitness could be wrong. In other words, if the iden-
tification is corroborated by other evidence, the trial court will
have more latitude in excluding the evidence than it will have if
the corroborating evidence is weak. The importance attached to
the eyewitness identification and the need to fully understand
the factors affecting its accuracy is greater where the corrobora-
tion is less.
One case which has applied the Court of Appeals' test in
Young is People v. Williams.168 In Williams, the defendant was
indicted on robbery charges stemming from the robbery of a
laundromat 69 The defendant was identified by one of the vic-
tims from a photo array, then by both victims in a police line-
up.17 0 Other than the identifications, which were cross-racial in
nature (the defendant was black and the victims were His-
167. Id.
168. No. 8989/05, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4329, (Sup. Ct. Nov. 29, 2006).
169. Id. at *1.
170. Id. at *2.
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panic),171 there was no independent evidence corroborating the
victims' identification testimony.172 Prior to trial, the defendant
moved to introduce the testimony of an expert on eyewitness
identification, who proposed to explain the problems associated
with, among other factors, cross-racial identifications. 73
After a Frye hearing, the trial court allowed the expert to
testify at trial. The opinion set forth at great length the scien-
tific basis for the witness' opinion, as well as her impressive cre-
dentials and personal research, 74 concluding that the research
underlying the testimony was sound and that the witness' ex-
pert testimony was not within the knowledge of the ordinary
juror. 75
As the court in Williams noted, a Frye hearing was hardly
necessary in this case, in light of the Court of Appeals decision
in Young. 76 After all, Williams is the paradigmatic example
given in Young: the case with uncorroborated eyewitness testi-
mony, in which "it might well . . . [be] an abuse of discretion to
deny the jury the benefit of [an expert's] opinions.' 77 The court
in Williams seems to accept that in this situation, an in-depth
Frye hearing assessing the underlying science of the testimony
and whether it was within the experience of the average juror
was unnecessary; all that was required was to assess whether
the testimony would assist the jury in light of the other evi-
dence present in the case.
VIII. Conclusion: Beyond Young and Williams
The question that remains is whether the test articulated
by the Court of Appeals in Young really solves the problem of
171. Id. at *6.
172. Id. at *2.
173. Id. at *1 n.2.
174. Id. at *3-7.
175. Id. at *14-15. The opinion notes that a full Frye hearing was only held in
light of the recent decision of the First Department in People v. Legrand, 814
N.Y.S.2d 37 (App. Div. 2006), which was decided after Young and still rejected
defendant's argument that exclusion of expert testimony in that case was an abuse
of discretion. Id. at *13. The Williams court criticizes the Legrand court for criti-
quing the methodology of some of the studies relied on, as well as their definition of
the relevant scientific community, and concludes that Legrand is not a bar to al-
lowing testimony in this case. Id. at *15 n.46.
176. Id. at *13.
177. People v. Young, 850 N.E.2d 623, 626-27 (N.Y. 2006).
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inconsistent standards for admissibility of expert testimony on
cross-racial eyewitness identification. Williams is an easy case
because there was no evidence corroborating the eyewitness
identification at all. Nevertheless, does Young really help a
trial court decide what is admissible outside of this extreme
situation? 178
As noted in Part V, the lack of uniform standards by any
trial court in New York to use prior to Young (and perhaps even
after) when deciding the admissibility of eyewitness expert tes-
timony has led to inconsistent precedent in the past. Radcliffe
is the only case that has attempted to remedy this situation. It
recognized that without some type of admissibility criteria, a
trial court has no real guideposts on which to rely.179
Have these guideposts been improved by Young? On the
one hand, Young is fairly clear on what will be considered an
abuse of discretion (excluding expert testimony on eyewitness
identification when there is no independent evidence cor-
roborating the identification, as in Williams) and what will not
be considered an abuse of discretion (excluding the testimony
178. Returning briefly to the Daubert or Frye controversy of Part II, supra,
one commentator has argued that adopting the Daubert standard in New York
would also solve the problem of eyewitness expert testimony admissibility; cases
like Legrand would be decided differently under Daubert, because Daubert would
"provide trial courts with a reasonable standard to control the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony." See Woller, supra note 75, at 350-51.
179. At least one commentator has suggested that disallowing expert testi-
mony on cross-racial eyewitness identification presents a very real constitutional
issue: exclusion of the testimony is a deprivation of a defendant's due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Radha Natarajan, Racialized Mem-
ory and Reliability: Due Process Applied to Cross-Racial Eyewitness Identification,
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 182, 1823-24; cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
... ."). This theory presupposes that the science behind the own-race bias (ORB)
theory discussed in Part I, supra, is sound enough to necessitate additional process
to guard against the "racialized nature of memory," and argues that expert testi-
mony may not be enough since many courts continue to exclude it. See Natarajan,
supra, at 1821, 1824. This is an interesting and potentially troubling argument,
especially in light of the fact that the Supreme Court has never specifically dealt
with the issue of whether there are admissibility standards for cross-racial eyewit-
ness identifications. Id. at 1823-24. While the Supreme Court did adopt a two-
prong test in Manson v. Braithwaite to determine what standard an eyewitness
identification must meet in order to comport with the Due Process Clause, they
have never considered whether the nature of a cross-racial identification requires
special protection, nor did they specifically address the cross-racial nature of the
identification as a factor in Manson. 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
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where there is corroboration "strong enough for the trial court
to reasonably conclude that the expert's testimony would be of
minor importance," as in Young).180 At the same time, the ma-
jority opinion is clear that the testimony in Young could have
been admitted by the trial court, even with the strong cor-
roborating evidence, and that such inclusion would also not
have been an abuse of discretion.' 8 ' While "discretion" does
mean that trial judges have the ability to make independent de-
cisions based on the facts within certain parameters, the Court
of Appeals decision in Young gives extremely wide latitude to
judges on inclusion or exclusion of expert testimony on eyewit-
ness identification, requiring only that there be some undefined
amount of evidence corroborating the identification for the
judge to exercise his discretion.
Perhaps recognizing the problems which still remain after
Young, the Court of Appeals again took up the issue of a trial
court's discretion in the area of expert testimony on eyewitness
identification in late March 2007. While reviewing the decision
of the trial court in People v. Legrand to exclude such expert
testimony, the Court of Appeals articulated a four-part test
which, if satisfied, would render a trial court's decision to ex-
clude expert testimony an abuse of discretion where the case
turned upon the accuracy of an identification and there was lit-
tle or no additional evidence which would tend to implicate the
defendant:
[I]t is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to exclude expert
testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications if that
testimony is (1) relevant to the witness's identification of defen-
dant, (2) based on principles that are generally accepted within
the relevant scientific community, (3) proffered by a qualified ex-
pert and (4) on a topic beyond the ken of the average juror.'8 2
However, the Court of Appeals only provides a test for a trial
court's exclusion of expert testimony on eyewitness identifica-
tion where there is "little or no corroborating evidence connect-
ing defendant to the crime.' ' 8 3 While clarifying what an abuse
180. People v. Young, 850 N.E.2d 623, 626-27 (N.Y. 2006).
181. Id. at 626.
182. People v. Legrand, No. 39, 2007 N.Y. LEXIS 325, at *2 (N.Y. Mar. 27,
2007).
183. Id.
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of discretion is under those limited circumstances, Legrand still
leaves unresolved the questions of: (1) what "little" corroborat-
ing evidence is; and (2) what could constitute an abuse of discre-
tion when that unknown amount of corroboration is exceeded.
Even after Legrand, judges still have almost unfettered dis-
cretion in the decision to include or exclude expert testimony,
especially where some corroboration exists. By allowing such
discretion, the result is that defendants remain uncertain as to
their chances of success in introducing expert testimony at trial.
Rather than solving the problem of inconsistent standards for
admissibility that cases like Smith and Carrieri posed, Young
merely complicates the puzzle by introducing a new grey area
between the poles of "strong corroboration" and "no corrobora-
tion" that gives judges broad discretion in their choices regard-
ing expert testimony and leaves defendants as confused as ever.
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